Introduction
In the juridical tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, citizenship was simply a matter of a person's nationality. In more recent debates, however, it has become linked to one's political identity (Cerutti, 1996; Cerutti and D'Andrea, 2000) . The principle questions involved in this new conception of citizenship regard the political order, membership and its symbols, the combination of rights and duties applicable to the individual, and the devices of inclusion and exclusion. Applied to the European Union, these questions appear extremely demanding. To deal with them properly would require the combined competences of a philosopher, a sociologist, a political scientist and a jurist. In this chapter, these questions will serve only as reference points for a historical analysis comparing the development of citizenship in the European Union with that found in European nation-states during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The individual and the political-juridical order: the sovereign state and the 'European juridical space' Centred on the relationship between the subject and the political community, the concept of citizenship is closely linked to the politicaljuridical order within which the subject acts. Hence, the characteristics of the European institutional space are not an insignificant fact, but one of the conditioning factors determining the political-juridical identity of the individual.
Given that the order with which citizenship seems necessarily associated is the state order (according to a received, if recently contested, view), a historical comparison of the most consolidated tradition (or traditions) of citizenship with the image of the new European order clearly provokes the sense of a fundamental break. The link between citizenship and state sovereignty was an essential part of the entire formation (both structural and cultural) of the 'modern' state, but became especially important in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when, with evermore insistence, the immediate relationship between the individual and the state was presented as the determining factor in the identity of the individual (Costa, 2000) . The political and juridical tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was dominated by the need to identify a magnet that could attract individuals with an irresistible force, to create a unity that could resist the centrifugal forces and lacerations of growing social conflict. This need did not automatically imply a devaluing of the liberty of individuals; however, liberty was strictly associated with a collective entity (the nation-state), which constituted not only the 'external' guarantee, but also the intrinsic foundation, of liberty itself.
The 'statist' choice of nineteenth-and twentieth-century juridical culture (in Germany as well as in Italy and France)-a choice that was not unanimous but certainly made by the majority-can be interpreted as the juridical expression of a more general tendency for the dislocation or de-centralization of the individual. The new 'centre' had to be the 'organic' SOCiety, or the nation, or the class or, finally, the state: whatever the central point, the 'enemy' to overcome was the (enlightened) self-sufficiency of the individual, whose liberty (even when it was claimed as an important value, as it often was) had to be deduced from (and rooted in) some collective entity.
It was from this perspective that the continental juridical tradition chose the state as an 'absolute' reference point, conceived the individual in relationship to it, and made it the condition by which individual rights were possible. In the juridical tradition, 'statism' was not merely an ideological option, but, it appears, an axiom on which the possibility of a scientific (rational, well-founded) understanding of the juridical order itself depended. It was precisely the fundamental importance of the state and its absolute sovereign power that made the foundation of rights problematic. Given the state and its sovereignty, points of 'absolute' resistance to its power could not be acknowledged; if they were, they would infringe upon the sovereignty of the state (the individuals and their rights would be 'sovereign'), and the very possibility and conceivability of the juridical order would be lost. The trick that made
